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Note: This manuscript will be edited and published by the George Washington 
Law Review in 2012 (vol. 81).  The author welcomes comments. 
 
 
A CONCISE GUIDE TO THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787 AS A SOURCE OF THE 
ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
by Gregory E. Maggs* 
 
I. Introduction 
The records of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 are often cited in 
support of claims about the original meaning of the Constitution.1  These records 
consist of an official journal of the proceedings, notes taken by participants at the 
Convention, preliminary drafts of the Constitution, and various other documents.2 
Despite the frequency of their citation, working with these sources is difficult, and 
most law schools provide little training in their use.   Accordingly, judges, lawyers, 
law clerks, law students, and legal academics may feel uncomfortable in relying on 
the records or in assessing arguments made by others about what the records 
might show.  The purpose of this essay is to provide helpful guidance on this 
subject.3 
                                       
* Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School.  This essay was 
presented at a Symposium Commemorating the 100th Anniversary of Farrand’s Records of 
the Federal Convention sponsored by the George Washington Law Review and the Institute 
for Constitutional History on November 3-4, 2011.  I am very grateful to the other 
speakers and the members of the audience who provided me with helpful guidance and 
advice. 
1 See infra part III.A (describing how cases and law review articles have cited the records). 
2 See infra part II.D (identifying the known records of the Convention).  Most of the records 
are collected in THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
[hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS], a 3-volume work cited throughout this essay.  A further 
description of this work and supplements to it appears in part II.D. 
3 For similar guides concerning the records of the state ratifying conventions and the 
Federalist Papers, see Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to The Records of the State 
Ratifying Conventions as a Source of the Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitution, 2009 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 457, and Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a 
Source of the Original Meaning of the United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 801 (2007). 
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The essay first describes the Constitutional Convention and the various 
kinds of records that were kept of its proceedings.4  The essay then explains, with 
examples, how judicial opinions and academic works draw upon the records for 
evidence of the Constitution’s original meaning, including both the meaning that 
the Framers may have subjectively intended the document to have and also other 
possible meanings.5  The essay next identifies and assesses seven important 
potential grounds for impeaching assertions about what the records show.6  Each 
of these potential grounds has merit in some contexts, but all of them are also 
subject to significant limitations or counter arguments.  The essay, accordingly, 
recommends that anyone making or evaluating claims about the original meaning 
of the Constitution should proceed with caution, carefully taking into account 
both the possible grounds for impeaching claims and the arguments against these 
grounds.  Appendices to this essay include an annotated bibliography and a table 
of the deputies who participated at the Constitutional Convention. 7 
This essay does not address the important question of whether or to what 
extent courts today should be bound to follow the original meaning of the 
Constitution.  Other works, of course, discuss this issue in great detail.8  This 
essay simply assumes that lawyers, judges, and scholars may be interested in 
knowing what the records reveal about the original meaning of the Constitution 
regardless of the extent to which they consider this meaning to control modern 
constitutional interpretation. 
II.  The Convention and the Records of the Convention 
 A.  Calling the Convention 
                                       
4 See infra part II. 
5 See infra part III. 
6 See infra part IV. 
7 See infra appendices A (annotated bibliography) & B (table of deputies). 
8 Classic works arguing that judges should follow the original meaning of the Constitution 
include RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING 
OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional 
Interpretation, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 631 (1993); and Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser 
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).  Classic works expressing the opposite view include 
Boris I. Bittker, The Bicentennial of the Jurisprudence of Original Intent: The Recent Past, 77 
CAL. L. REV. 235 (1989); and H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original 
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). 
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Between 1781 and 1789, the United States was joined in union by the 
Articles of Confederation.9  The Articles of Confederation established a unicameral 
Congress consisting of representatives from all thirteen states.10  The Articles gave 
this Congress limited powers,11 but otherwise recognized that “[e]ach state retains 
its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and 
right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated.”12  The functioning of 
the Union under the Articles of Confederation was not entirely successful, and by 
1786 deteriorating economic conditions in the United States had become a subject 
of great concern.  Much of the blame lay at the feet of burdensome state commerce 
regulations.13  At the suggestion of James Madison, the state of Virginia invited all 
of the other states to send representatives to a convention in Annapolis, Maryland, 
to discuss these conditions.14  Virginia further proposed that the convention write 
a report to Congress regarding possible changes to the Articles of Confederation to 
ameliorate the situation.15 
The Annapolis Convention met in September 1786, but did not achieve its 
intended goals.16  Only five of the thirteen states sent commissioners.17  They were 
too few in number to make any useful recommendations regarding commerce or 
                                       
9 See 1 JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787: A COMPREHENSIVE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICA’S FOUNDING 33-34 (2005) (describing the Articles of 
Confederation). 
10 See Articles of Confederation art. V. 
11 See id. art. IX. 
12 Id. art. II. 
13 Alexander Hamilton explained: “The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some 
States, contrary to the true spirit of the Union, have, in different instances, given just 
cause of umbrage and complaint to others, and it is to be feared that examples of this 
nature, if not restrained by a national control, would be multiplied and extended till they 
became not less serious sources of animosity and discord than injurious impediments to 
the intercourse between the different parts of the Confederacy.”  THE  FEDERALIST No.  22, 
at 130 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961). 
14 Resolution of the General Assembly of Virginia Proposing a Joint Meeting of 
Commissioners From the States to Consider and Recommend a Federal Plan for 
Regulating Commerce, Jan. 21, 1786, in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF 
THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 38 (Charles C. Tansill ed. 1927) [hereinafter 
DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION]. 
15 See id. 
16 See 1 VILE, supra note 9, at 19-21 (2005) (describing the Annapolis Convention).  
17 1 THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES iv (Joseph 
Gales ed. 1834) [hereinafter Annals of Congress] 
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other subjects.18  The Articles of Confederation required unanimous approval of 
every state for any changes,19 and the commissioners properly worried that the 
states who had not sent representatives later might disagree with their 
recommendations.  Before disbanding, however, the commissioners took one 
extremely important action.  Finding “important defects in the system of the 
Federal Government,”20 they at the Annapolis Convention proposed that each 
state send representatives to another convention to be held the following year.  
This second convention, they urged, should: 
meet at Philadelphia on the second Monday in May next, to take into 
consideration the situation of the United States, to devise such 
further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the 
constitution of the Federal Government adequate to the exigencies of 
the Union.21 
Congress acted on this suggestion by calling for a second convention “for 
the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and 
reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions 
therein as shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the states render 
the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government & the 
preservation of the Union.”22  This second convention became known as the 
Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787. 
The Convention met in Philadelphia on a total of 79 days between May 14, 
1787, and September 17, 1787.23  During this time, the Convention departed from 
the mission that Congress had given it.  The Convention did not simply draft 
“alterations” for the Articles of Confederation as amendments.  Instead, it 
proposed an entirely new Constitution to replace the Articles of Confederation. 
                                       
18 See id.  
19 See Articles of Confederation, art. XIII. 
20 Proceedings of Commissioners to Remedy Defects of the Federal Government, Sept. 14, 
1786, in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION, supra note 14, at 42. 
21 Id. 
22 Report of Proceedings in Congress, Feb. 21, 1787, in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE 
FORMATION, supra note 14, at 44.  Some of the states sent deputies under different 
instructions. 
23 The Convention did not meet (1) on Sundays; (2) between May 15 and May 24; (3) on 
July 3 or 4; and (4) between July 27 and Aug 5.  See 1 VILE, supra note 9, at 77. 
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The Convention did not ask Congress or the state legislatures to approve the 
proposed Constitution.  Instead, perhaps fearing delay and possible defeat, the 
Convention called for separate ratifying conventions to be held in each state.24  
Although this arrangement stripped Congress and the state legislatures of some 
power, they did not block the procedure. 
 B.  Deputies Attending the Constitutional Convention of 1787 
The states each were free to send multiple “deputies”25 to the Constitutional 
Convention.  At the Convention, however, each state only had one vote.26  In total, 
fifty-five men attended the Convention.27  These men represented all of the states 
except Rhode Island, which chose not to participate. 
Many of the deputies arrived late.  In fact, although the Convention was 
scheduled to begin on May 14, 1787, a quorum did not gather until May 25, 
1787.28  Participants continued to trickle in after that.  The deputies from New 
Hampshire were the tardiest, first arriving on July 23, 1787.29  In addition, some 
deputies exited before the close of the Convention.  As described more fully below, 
deputies from Maryland and New York departed because they opposed 
abandoning the Articles of Confederation. 
                                       
24 See U.S. Const. art. VII (specifying the ratification process). Rufus King of 
Massachusetts said that he favored presenting the Constitution to ratifying conventions 
rather than state legislatures because “[t]he Legislatures . . . being to lose power, will be 
most likely to raise objections.”  1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 123 (Madison's 
Notes, Jun. 5, 1787) (statement of Rufus King). 
25 Some sources, including some Supreme Court cases, informally refer to the 
representatives as “delegates” rather than “deputies.”  See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 
U.S. 668, 674 (1984).  But “deputies” is a more accurate term.  The states gave credentials 
(i.e., written statements of authority) to their representatives.  These credentials typically 
described the representatives as “deputies.”  See, e.g., Credentials of the Members of the 
Federal Convention, State of Georgia, in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION, supra 
note 14, at 82.  In addition, the official journal of the Convention uses the term “deputy” to 
describe the representatives.  See, e.g., 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 1 (Journal, 
May 25, 1787).  In addition, when George Washington signed the Constitution, he 
identified himself as the “Presidt and deputy from Virginia” at the Convention.  U.S. Const. 
signatures. 
26 See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 11 (Madison’s Notes, May 28, 1787). 
27 See infra Appendix B (listing deputies). 
28 See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 1 (Journal, May 25, 1787). 
29 See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 84 (Journal, May 23, 1787). 
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At the end of the Convention, thirty-eight deputies signed the 
Constitution.30  One deputy also signed for an absent colleague.31  Three others 
who were present decided not to sign the Constitution either because they 
opposed its provisions or because they wanted to reserve judgment.32 
In general, the deputies were a distinguished group.  Historian Richard B. 
Lewis has tallied their remarkable political accomplishments: 
Three had been in the Stamp Act Congress, seven in the First 
Continental Congress.  Eight had signed the Declaration of 
Independence, and two, the Articles of Confederation.  Two would 
become President, one Vice President, and two Chief Justices of the 
Supreme Court.  Sixteen had been or would later hold State 
governorships.  Forty-two at one time or another had sat in one or 
another of the Continental Congresses, while at least 30 were 
Revolutionary War veterans.33 
Some of the deputies participated more actively than others in framing the 
Constitution.  Accordingly, time and again, the names of a select few of these 
deputies appear in the records of the Convention.  These important deputies fall 
into seven groups: the grand eminences, the visionaries, the conciliators, the 
dissenters, the disappointed, the unsure, and the absent. 
The grand eminences were George Washington and Benjamin Franklin.  
George Washington came as a deputy from Virginia and presided over the 
Convention, except when it sat as a committee of the whole.34  Having kept the 
Army together throughout the war, and led it to victory, he was widely viewed as 
the greatest living American.  Although he participated substantively only once in 
the debates,35 his presence had great importance because it gave prestige and 
dignity to the entire enterprise. 
                                       
30 See U.S. Const. signatures. 
31 George Read of Delaware also signed for his absent colleague John Dickinson.  See 3 
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 587. 
32 These deputies were Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, George Mason of Virginia, and 
Edmund Randolph of Virginia.  See id. at 588-590. 
33 RICHARD B. LEWIS, FRAMING OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 45 (1979). 
34 Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts presided when the Convention met as a Committee 
of the Whole.  See 1 VILE, supra note 9, at 110.  The Convention may have selected 
Gorham for this role to provide the northern states a position of authority.  See id.  
35 On the last day of the Convention, after mentioning that he had not previously spoken, 
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Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania was the oldest of the deputies, and was 
widely acclaimed as the most learned.  In addition to his great fame as a scientist, 
inventor, and publisher, Franklin was easily the most experienced diplomat and 
statesman in America.  Among his many other accomplishments, Franklin had 
helped draft and had signed the Declaration of Independence, he had proposed 
the Articles of Confederation, and he had negotiated the Treaty of Alliance with 
France and the Treaty of Paris with Britain.36  At the Convention, Franklin made 
several very significant speeches.37 
The visionaries were the deputies who had the strongest and best 
articulated ideas about the kind of government that the United States should 
have.  First among these men was James Madison.  Madison inspired what was 
called the Virginia Plan for the government (discussed below) and opposed other 
plans.38  Madison also attended every day of the Convention, spoke on most 
topics, and kept the most comprehensive and accurate notes.39 
Second among these visionaries was arguably James Wilson of 
Pennsylvania.  Wilson had the most democratic prescription for the new 
government.  He favored direct election of the President.  He also supported 
popular election of the House of Representatives.40  Wilson criticized the decision 
to limit Congress's power to restrict the importation of slaves,41 and he also 
supported the restriction on state interference with contracts.42 
Other visionaries included William Paterson (sometimes spelled Patterson) of 
New Jersey, Alexander Hamilton of New York, and Gouverneur43 Morris of 
                                                                                                                           
Washington urged his colleagues to change the representation in the House from not more 
than 1 in 40,000 to not more than 1 in 30,000.  See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, 
at 644 (Madison’s Notes, Sep. 17, 1787).  
36 See 2 VILE, supra note 9, at 616. 
37 See id. 
38 See 2 VILE, supra note 9, at 816. 
39 See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at xv-xix (discussing Madison's participation in 
the Convention and note taking). 
40 Id. at 49 (Madison’s Notes, May 31, 1787). 
41 See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 372 (Madison’s Notes, Aug. 22, 1787). 
42 Id. at 440 (Madison’s Notes, Aug. 28, 1787). 
43 Gouverneur Morris’s unusual first name has a simple explanation; he was named after 
his mother, whose maiden name was Sarah Gouverneur.  20 THE NEW YORK GENEALOGICAL 
AND BIOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY, THE NEW YORK GENEALOGICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL RECORD 23 
(1889). Gouverneur Morris held many political positions, but was never the “governor” of 
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Pennsylvania.  Paterson proposed the New Jersey Plan for the national 
government (discussed below), which would have benefited small states by giving 
all states equal representation in a unilateral legislature.44  Hamilton proposed his 
own plan, which would have created a strong federal government with an 
executive elected for life.45  The plan greatly would have reduced state sovereignty 
by allowing the national executive to appoint executives for each state 
government.  Based on the records, it appears that Gouverneur Morris spoke more 
than any other delegate.46 He persuaded James Randolph to change the first 
resolution of the Virginia plan to say that the national government should have 
separate legislative, executive, and judicial branches.47  This resolution not only 
established the basic structure of the new government, but also made clear that 
the Convention was going to do more than merely amend the Articles of 
Confederation.  Recognized as a master of elegant expression, Morris also did most 
of the final stylistic editing of the Constitution.48 
The principal conciliator was Roger Sherman of Connecticut.  Sherman 
proposed the “Great Compromise” (also known as the “Connecticut Compromise”) 
adopted by the Convention, under which each state would have equal 
representation in the Senate and proportional representation in the House.49  
Sherman also assisted others in preparing the Committee of Detail’s draft of the 
Constitution.50  Although described above as a grand eminence, Benjamin 
Franklin deserves additional recognition as a conciliator.  In late June, when the 
debates became particularly contentious over the states’ representation in 
Congress, Franklin proposed that the Convention institute the practice of 
beginning each session as a prayer as a way of overcoming their differences: 
                                                                                                                           
any state. 
44 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 611-614 (reprinting The New Jersey Plan or 
Paterson Resolutions). 
45 Id. at 617-630 (reprinting the Hamilton Plan). 
46 2 VILE, supra note 9, at 496. 
47 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 33 (Madison’s Notes, May 30, 1787).  The 
Committee of the Whole passed this resolution shortly afterward.  See id. at 35 (Madison’s 
Notes, May 30, 1787). 
48 See 1 VILE, supra note 9, at 108-109. 
49 Sherman proposed the compromise on June 11, 1787.  See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra 
note 2, at 196 (Madison’s Notes, June 11, 1787).  The Convention adopted the compromise 
on July 16, 1787.  See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 15 (Madison’s Notes, July 
16, 1787). 
50 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 97 (Journal, Jul. 24, 1787). 
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I therefore beg leave to move—that henceforth prayers imploring the 
assistance of Heaven, and its blessings on our deliberations, be held 
in this Assembly every morning before we proceed to business, and 
that one or more of the Clergy of this City be requested to officiate in 
that service.51 
In addition, at the close of the Convention, Franklin urged the deputies to put 
aside their disagreements with particular provisions of the draft and sign the 
Constitution.  In a now famous speech, he said: 
[T]he older I grow, the more apt I am to doubt my own judgment, and 
to pay more respect to the judgment of others. . . . I cannot help 
expressing a wish that every member of the Convention who may still 
have objections to it, would with me, on this occasion doubt a little of 
his own infallibility—and to make manifest our unanimity, put his 
name to this instrument.52 
The dissenters were the deputies who adamantly opposed the work of the 
Convention.  Robert Yates and John Lansing, Jr., both of New York, left the 
Convention on July 10, 1787. 53  They believed that their instructions did not 
permit them to participate in creating a new Constitution.54  Their departure had a 
significant effect.  It left Alexander Hamilton as the sole deputy remaining from 
New York.  Afterwards, Hamilton did not vote on questions before the Convention 
because he could not by himself represent New York’s delegation.55  Accordingly, 
New York effectively had no formal voice in the proceedings after July 10. 
                                       
51 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 452 (Madison’s Notes, Jun. 28, 1787) (statement 
of Benjamin Franklin). 
52 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 642-643 
53 See 2 JOHN R. VILE, supra note 9, at 852-83. 
54 See id. 
55 The Convention adopted a rule permitting a state to vote only when “fully represented.” 
See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 8 (Journal, May 28, 1787).  This rule prevented 
Hamilton from voting on behalf of New York, but did not prevent him from speaking.  At 
the close of the Convention, Hamilton signed the Constitution as a witness that the 
Convention was acting with the “unanimous consent of the states present.”  U.S. Const. 
signatures. This affirmation was true; although New York did not consent, it was not 
“present” after Lansing and Yates departed, and therefore the Constitution was approved 
with the unanimous consent of the states present, an event that Hamilton witnessed. 
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Two other dissenters, Luther Martin and John Frances Mercer, came from 
Maryland.  Martin wanted the Constitution to preserve state equality.56  He also 
proposed the language that later became the Supremacy Clause as an alternative 
to a proposal that would have allowed Congress to veto state legislation.57  Mercer 
was concerned that the Constitution did not sufficiently preserve state 
sovereignty.58  Both men left the Convention before its conclusion and later 
opposed its ratification in Maryland.59  
The disappointed included two deputies who stayed to the end of the 
Convention, but refused to sign the Constitution:  George Mason of Virginia and 
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts.  Although the details of their objections remain 
debated, both men generally worried that the Constitution would not protect 
individual liberty.60  Mason also predicted that the issue of slavery would cause 
great trouble for the nation.61 
Edmund J. Randolph of Virginia was famously unsure.  He made two great 
contributions to the Convention.  First, he formally proposed the Virginia Plan.62  
Second, while preparing the initial draft of the Constitution for the Committee of 
Detail, Randolph decided to “insert essential principles only”63 and to “use simple 
and precise language and generl propositions.”64 These decisions did much to give 
the Constitution its enduring quality.  Ultimately, however, Randolph did not sign 
the Constitution because he was unsure of its merits.65 
                                       
56 See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 324 (recording that Martin “could never 
accede to a plan that would introduce inequality”). 
57 See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 29 (Madison’s Notes, Jul. 17, 1787). 
58 For example, Mercer and Luther both believed that state consent should be necessary 
before Congress introduce any federal force into a state.  See 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra 
note 2, at 317 (Madison’s Notes, Aug. 17, 1787). 
59 See 1 VILE, supra note 9, at 450, 477. 
60 See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 646-47 (Madison, Sept. 17, 1787) (describing 
Gerry’s objections); id. at  649 (noting Mason’s refusal to sign).  
61 See id. 
62 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 20 (Madison’s Notes, May 29, 1787). 
63 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 137 & n.6 (quoting a document found among 
George Mason’s papers). 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 644, 646, 649 (Madison’s Notes, Sept. 17, 1787). 
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The absent included men whom the states had appointed to serve as 
deputies, but who did not attend the Convention.  These absentees included 
famous figures such as Richard Henry Lee, Patrick Henry, Thomas Jefferson, 
John Adams, Samuel Adams, John Hancock, and others.66 
 C.  What Happened at the Convention 
 For ease of understanding what happened at the Constitutional Convention, 
the proceedings might be divided into seven chronological segments which each 
involved significant events: 
 1. Period of May 14-29, 1787: The Deputies establish the rules and 
procedures of the Convention. 
 Although the Convention was to start on May 14, 1787, no business took 
place until a quorum was gathered on May 25, 1787.67  On that day, the deputies 
began their work by making important decisions about how they would proceed.  
They unanimously selected George Washington to serve as the Convention’s 
president.68 They then adopted rules governing the proceedings.  These rules 
specified, among other things, that each state present and fully represented would 
have one vote;69 that the proceedings would be kept secret;70 and that the 
Convention could reconsider items already voted on.71  
On May 29, 1787, Edmund Randolph offered 15 resolutions, each just one 
sentence in length.72  These resolutions—which became known as the “Virginia 
Plan” for government—reflected the ideas of James Madison.73  Under the Virginia 
Plan, the legislature would have two chambers, one directly elected by the people 
and the other nominated by the state legislatures.74  The Plan generally favored 
                                       
66 See 1 VILE, supra note 9, at 223. 
67 See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 3 (Madison’s Notes, May 25, 1787). 
68 See id. 
69 See id. at 11 (Madison’s Notes, May 28, 1787). 
70 See id. at 15 (Madison’s Notes, May 28, 1787).  
71 See id. at 16 (same). 
72 See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 20-22 (Madison, May 29, 1787). 
73 See 1 VILE, supra note 9, at 816. 
74 See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 20 (“3. Resd. that the National Legislature 
ought to consist of two branches.  4. Resd. that the members of the first branch of the 
National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States . . . .  5. Resold. 
that the members of the second branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by 
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the states with large populations (Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, and 
Virginia) because it called for proportional representation in both houses.75  After 
Randolph made this proposal, the Convention decided to meet as a “Committee of 
the Whole” to deliberate over the Plan.76  A committee of the whole is a committee 
that consists of all of the members of a deliberative body who are present.77  A 
committee of the whole is typically used by an assembly for initial drafting of 
documents because its more flexible rules facilitate discussion. 
2. Period of May 30-June 19: The Committee of the Whole considers the 
Virginia Plan, the New Jersey Plan, the Hamilton Plan, and other 
fundamental matters. 
From May 30 to June 19, the deputies primarily met as a Committee of the 
Whole. On the first day when meeting as a Committee of the Whole, Gouverneur 
Morris urged James Randolph to modify his resolutions to include the following 
proposal:  “Resolved, that a national government (ought to be established) 
consisting of a supreme Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary.”78  The Committee 
of the Whole voted to adopt this resolution the same day.79  With this action, the 
Committee of the Whole implicitly endorsed creating a new Constitution as the 
goal of the Convention, rather than merely amending the Articles of Confederation. 
The deputies principally debated the Virginia Plan on June 13 and 14.80  In 
this debate, the small states opposed the Virginia Plan because they believed that 
it eliminated state equality.81  Following debate on the competing plans, the 
Committee of the Whole agreed on many ideas that made their way into the final 
version of the Constitution: a single executive, a supreme court and inferior courts 
created by Congress, a requirement that Congress guarantee the states a 
republican form of government, a requirement that members of state governments 
swear to uphold the Constitution, and a plan for states to ratify the Constitution 
                                                                                                                           
those of the first, out of a proper number of persons nominated by the individual 
Legislatures . . . .”). 
75 See id. 
76 See id. at 23. 
77 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY ___ (9th ed. 2009). 
78 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 33 (Madison’s Notes, May 30, 1787) (emphasis in 
original). 
79 See id. at 35 (Madison’s Notes, May 30, 1787). 
80 See id. at 232-237, 240 (Madison’s Notes, Jun. 13 & 14, 1787). 
81 See id. 
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in state ratifying conventions.  These ideas were summarized in a report that was 
to be returned to the full Convention.82  Following the preparation of this report, 
William Patterson of New Jersey and Alexander Hamilton of New York 
subsequently proposed their alternative plans for the government,83 both of which 
are discussed above.  
3. Period of June 20-July 24: The Convention agrees to the Great Compromise 
and other Matters. 
During the period from June 20 to July 23, the deputies ceased meeting as 
a committee of the whole and met in full convention.  Important debates about 
representation in the legislative branch followed.  The large and small states 
initially could not agree on the composition of the legislative branch.  Ultimately, a 
modified version of the Virginia plan became acceptable to the Convention after 
the deputies agreed to what has become known as the “Great Compromise” (or 
alternatively as the “Connecticut Compromise”).  In this compromise, the states 
would have equal representation in the Senate, while the House would have 
proportional representation.84  This compromise balanced the interests of large 
and small states.  The Convention as part of this compromise adopted the 3/5ths 
rule, under which only 3/5ths of the slave populations would be counted for 
determining representation in the House. 
In addition to the Great Compromise, the Convention at this time also 
addressed a variety of other important topics.  They agreed, for example, that 
federal laws would be supreme over state laws,85 that judges would be appointed 
by the President with the advice and consent of the second branch of the 
legislature,86 and the federal government would guarantee that each state had a 
                                       
82 See id. at 235-237. 
83 See id. at 242 (Madison’s Notes, Jun. 15, 1787) (introduction of Paterson’s Plan); id. at 
291 (Madison’s Notes, Jun. 18, 1787) (introduction of Hamilton’s Plan). 
84 The 3/5ths Compromise linked direct taxation to representation in the popularly elected 
branch of the federal government.  On July 12, 1787, the Convention agreed to the 3/5th 
rule as a principle to govern direct taxation.  The Convention resolved “that the rule of 
contribution by direct taxation for the support of the government of the United States shall 
be the number of white inhabitants, and three fifths of every other description in the 
several States . . . .”  1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 589 (Journal, Jul. 12, 1787).  
On July 16, 1787, the Convention resolved that in one branch of the legislature 
“representation ought to be proportioned according to direct Taxation” and that “in the 
second Branch of the Legislature of the United States each State shall have an equal vote. 
 See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 14 (Journal, Jul. 14, 1787). 
85 Id. at 22 (Journal, Jul. 17, 1787). 
86 See id. at 38 (Journal, Jul. 18, 1787). 
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republican form of government.87  On July 23, 1787, with the general structure of 
the government settled, the Full Convention created a “Committee of Detail” to 
turn the plan into an initial draft of the Constitution.88  The Full Convention 
recessed shortly afterward and waited for the Committee of Detail to perform its 
work.89 
4. Period of July 24-August 5: The Committee of Detail prepares a draft of the 
Constitution. 
The Committee of Detail met from July 24 to August 5, with Edmund 
Randolph and James Wilson doing most of the drafting.90  The goal of the 
Committee was to put all of the matters approved by the Convention into the form 
of a constitution.  When the Committee of Detail had finished its work, it had 
produced a draft containing 23 articles.91  The draft produced was a cross between 
a list of resolutions and a document that looks like our current Constitution.  It 
sent to a printer for distribution to all of the deputies.92  In addition to describing 
the new Congress and the selection of its members, the Committee of Detail added 
the list of the congressional powers and the list of the limitations on state 
legislation.93 
5. Period of August 6-September 8: The Convention debates aspects of the 
Report of the Committee of Detail. 
From August 6 to September 8, the Full Convention debated the Committee 
of Detail’s draft and other important matters.  They considered among many other 
questions topics such as limiting suffrage to property owners,94 the problems of 
slavery,95 and the need for each state to give full faith and credit to acts of the 
others.96  During this time, the Convention referred some matters to separate 
committees, which met and reported back to the Convention.  After reaching final 
                                       
87 See id. at 39. 
88 See id. at 95 & n.10 (Journal, Jul. 23, 1787). 
89 See id. at 118. 
90 See VILE, supra note 9, at 105-106. 
91 See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 129-175 (Report of the Committee of Detail) 
92 See id. at 175 (McHenry’s Notes, Aug. 4, 2011). 
93 See id. at 143-145 (Committee of Detail) 
94 See id. at 201-207 (Madison’s Notes, Aug. 7, 1787). 
95 See id. at 221-223 (Madison’s Notes, Aug. 8, 1787). 
96 See id. at 486 (Journal, Sep. 4, 1787).  
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conclusions on most items, the Convention appointed a “Committee of Style and 
Arrangement” to prepare a draft putting the Constitution in a consistent and near 
final form.97  
6. Period of September 8-12: The Committee of Style and Arrangements 
prepares a near final draft of the Constitution 
From September 8 to 12, the Committee of Style and Arrangement, acting 
on the Convention’s decision, prepared a near final version of the Constitution.98  
Gouverneur Morris did much of the work, although the Committee also included 
James Madison, William Johnson, Rufus King, and Alexander Hamilton.99  A 
printer made copies of the Committee’s draft for all of the deputies.100  The 
Committee of Style had no authorization to alter the meaning of the 
Constitution.101  But this does not mean that the Committee’s revisions are to be 
ignored.  In Nixon v. United States,102 the Supreme Court considered the phrase in 
Article I, section 2 giving the Senate “the sole power to try impeachments.”103  The 
petitioner argued that the word “sole” had no substantive meaning because it was 
a “cosmetic edit” added by the Committee of Style.104  The Supreme Court rejected 
this view, asserting “we must presume that the Committee’s reorganization or 
rephrasing accurately captured what the Framers meant in their unadorned 
language. . . . We [conclude] that ‘the word “sole” is entitled to no less weight than 
any other word of the text, because the Committee revision perfected what “had 
been agreed to.” ’ ”105 
 7. Period of September 12-17: The Convention debates the Committee of 
Style’s draft, makes slight modifications, and then approves the 
Constitution. 
                                       
97 See id. at 547 (Journal, Sep. 4, 1787). 
98 See id. at 565-580 (Draft of the Committee of Style and Arrangement). 
99 See 1 VILE, supra note 9, at 109. 
100 See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 585 (Madison’s Notes, Sep. 12, 1787) 
101 See id. at 553 (Madison’s Notes, Sep. 8, 1787) (noting that “A Committee was then 
appointed by Ballot to revise the stile of and arrange the articles which had been agreed to 
by the House,” which implies that the Committee did not have authorization to make 
changes that the Convention had not agreed upon). 
102 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
103 U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
104 Nixon, 506 U.S. at 231. 
105 Id. (quoting the respondent’s brief) 
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The Convention then proceeded to debate the Committee of Style=s draft for 
several days.  On September 12, 1787, George Mason and Elbridge Gerry 
proposed the inclusion of a declaration of individual rights.106  The Convention 
quickly voted 10 states to none to reject this proposal after Roger Sherman briefly 
argued that the “State Declaration of Rights are not repealed” and that the 
national “Legislature may be safely trusted.”107  On September 17, 1787, following 
a number of minor modifications, the Convention approved the Constitution.  All 
of the individual deputies who were still at the Convention, except for Elbridge 
Gerry, George Mason, and Edmund Randolph, signed the Constitution.108  The 
Convention then adjourned. 
Article VII says that the Constitution was approved “in Convention by the 
Unanimous Consent of the States present.”109  This statement is true, but it does 
not tell the whole story.  Although the Constitution was approved by all states 
“present,” it was not approved by Rhode Island or New York.  Rhode Island did not 
approve the Constitution, but it was not “present” because it sent no deputies. 
New York also did not approve the Constitution but it also was not “present”; 
although Alexander Hamilton remained after Robert Yates and John Lansing 
departed, Hamilton could not represent the state by himself.  This detail is 
somewhat concealed because Hamilton signed the Constitution, identifying 
himself as a deputy from New York.  Hamilton could sign because the caption 
above the signatures on the Constitution says that the signers had “subscribed” 
their names merely in “witness” of the unanimous approval of the states presents; 
the signatures therefore were not the approval itself.110 
 D.  Records of the Constitutional Convention 
Although the Constitutional Convention met in secret, with the members 
agreeing not to discuss what took place,111 we now know a great deal about what 
transpired during the proceedings.  The Convention appointed Major William 
                                       
106 See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 587–588 (Madison’s Notes, Sept. 12, 1787). 
107 Id. at 588. 
108 See U.S. Const. signatures.  Notice that Alexander Hamilton signed the Constitution as 
a witness from New York, even though New York’s delegation did not approve the 
Constitution. 
109 U.S. Const. art. VII. 
110 See id. 
111 See 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at 15 (Journal, May 29, 1787) (recording that 
the Convention resolved “[t]hat nothing spoken in the House be printed, or otherwise 
published, or communicated without leave”). 
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Jackson to serve as the secretary.112  In this capacity, he kept an official Journal 
of the proceedings.113  The Journal includes minutes of the full Convention and 
the proceedings as a Committee of a Whole.  The minutes record the text of most 
of the resolutions before the Convention and the votes taken on them.  
Unfortunately, William Jackson made some mistakes in his record keeping.  In 
addition, Jackson also omitted various important details, such as the dates of 
certain votes.  Jackson also intentionally destroyed some of the records, either 
because he did not think them worth saving or because he was seeking to 
preserve secrecy.  Professor Max Farrand, the great scholar of the Constitutional 
Convention, accordingly has cautioned:  “With notes so carelessly kept, as were 
evidently those of the secretary, the Journal cannot be relied on absolutely.”114  
In addition to the Journal, at least eight of the deputies kept notes.  James 
Madison attended every day of the Convention, and took substantial notes on each 
day.115  For the most part, the notes taken by other deputies merely supplement 
what is found in Madison’s notes.  Madison wrote an introduction to his notes 
explaining how he had prepared them.  He said: 
In pursuance of the task I had assumed I chose a seat in front of the 
presiding member, with the other members on my right & left hands. 
In this favorable position for hearing all that passed, I noted in terms 
legible & in abbreviations & marks intelligible to myself what was 
read from the Chair or spoken by the members; and losing not a 
moment unnecessarily between the adjournment & reassembling of 
the Convention I was enabled to write out my daily notes . . . during 
the session or within a few finishing days after its close . . . in the 
extent and form preserved in my own hand on my files.116 
Professor Farrand has noted an aspect of Madison’s notes that deserves 
special attention. Madison published the notes late in life, when his memory of the 
Convention may have faded somewhat.  To refresh his recollection, he relied on 
William Jackson’s Journal to make revisions.  In so doing, he may have 
introduced errors.117 
                                       
112 See id. at 6 (Yates’s Notes, May 25, 1787). 
113 See id. at xi-xiv (describing the Journal). 
114 See id. at xiii. 
115 See id. at xv-xix (describing Madison’s notes). 
116 See id. at xvi (quoting Madison’s introduction). 
117 See id. at xvii-xviii. 
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Although Madison took the most complete notes, the historical record also 
includes notes taken by seven other deputies.  These deputies include: 
  # Alexander Hamilton of New York, who kept brief notes on eight days of the 
convention;118 
  # Rufus King of Massachusetts, who took extensive notes on 18 days of the 
convention;119 
  # George Mason of Virginia, who took only a few pages of notes;120 
  # James McHenry of Maryland, who took extensive notes before June 1, 1787 
and after August 5th (but none in between because he was absent attending 
to an ill relative);121 
  # William Paterson of New Jersey, who made a variety of notes over the course 
of the Convention;122 
  # William Pierce of Georgia, who kept brief but interesting notes at the start of 
the Convention;123 and 
  # Robert Yates of New York, who took notes consistently from May 31, 1787 
until July 5, 1787.124 
 D. Publication of the Records 
The Convention, as explained above, decided that its deliberation should 
remain secret.  William Jackson’s journal and the notes taken by the various 
deputies, accordingly, were kept confidential for many years following the 
Constitutional Convention.  Jackson turned his journal over to George 
Washington, who in turn gave it to the Department of State.  The Department of 
State held the Journal for many years.  Not until 1819 was the Journal—as edited 
by John Adams at the direction of Congress—first published.125  Yates published 
                                       
118 See id. at xxi. 
119 See id. at xix. 
120 See id. at xxi. 
121 See id. at xx. 
122 See id. at xxi 
123 See id. 
124 See id. at xiv. 
125 See id. at xiv. 
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his notes in 1821.126  Madison’s notes were published posthumously in 1840.  All 
of the other notes became public at later dates.127 
Between 1894 and 1905, the Bureau of Rolls and Library at the U.S. State 
Department compiled The Documentary History of the Constitution of the United 
States of America, 1786-1870, a five-volume work that among other things 
collected almost all of the known notes and records of the Constitutional 
Convention.128 
In 1911, Professor Max Farrand of Yale University prepared a 3-volume 
collection of all the known notes and similar documents from the Convention 
called The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787.129  Farrand’s Records is a 
highly influential and accurate collection of the notes and records of the 
Constitutional Convention.  Professor Farrand for the first time placed the 
materials in chronological order, interspersing the journal entries and the notes 
taken by the various deputies.  This organization facilitated attempts to follow the 
events of the convention as they unfolded.  He tracked down numerous other 
sources in addition to the notes, such as correspondence by the deputies shedding 
light on the Convention’s actions.  He also addressed and clarified a large number 
of ambiguities in the notes. 
Volume 1 of Farrand’s Records includes a very helpful introduction followed 
by materials from the Convention, such as excerpts from Madison’s notes and the 
Journal, that start on May 25, 1787, and run until July 13, 1787.  Volume 2 
includes materials from July 14, 1787, until the Convention ended on September 
17, 1787.  Volume 3 includes supplementary materials, such as copies of the 
Virginia Plan, New Jersey Plan, the Hamilton Plan, and various drafts of the 
Constitution.  In 1937, the three original volumes were reprinted and a fourth 
volume with even more supplementary materials was added.130   In 1987, James 
H. Hutson, with the assistance of Leonard Rapport, prepared a Supplement to Max 
Farrand’s the Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,131 which included various 
                                       
126 See id. at xii. 
127 See id. at xiv. 
128 The Documentary History of the Constitution of the United States of America, 1786-1870 
(1894-1905) (five volumes).  This work is available for free at the Google Books website.  
For more on the history see 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2, at xii n.8. 
129 See FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 2. 
130 See 4 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937). 
131 SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND'S RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (James H. 
Hutson ed., 1987). 
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additional letters and other works, including George Washington’s diary during 
the Convention. Because of its comprehensive collection, chronological 
organization, and attention to detail, Farrand’s Records and its supplements are 
the preferred sources of the courts and most scholars.  As explained in the 
Appendix, the Library of Congress’s website includes a copy of the 1911 edition of 
Farrand’s work, in both an image format and a searchable text format; 
accordingly, it is now much easier to located relevant information in the records 
than in the past.132 
One final very practical matter merits brief mention: Because almost all 
courts and law review articles rely on Max Farrand’s Records, questions often 
arise about how to cite them.  I recommend that writers use the general Bluebook 
citation form for multivolume books with an editor133 followed by two optional but 
very helpful parenthetical phrases.  The first parenthetical phrase should identify 
the source of the record (e.g., “Madison’s Notes,” “Journal,” etc.) and the date of 
the record.  The second parenthetical should identify the speaker if a speaker is 
being quoted.  In addition, because the title of the multivolume work is so long 
that it would be cumbersome to repeat it in subsequent citations, I also 
recommend establishing a shortened form for referring to it.134  The typical short 
form, used in the Harvard Law Review and elsewhere, is “FARRAND’S RECORDS.”  
Consider for example an article citing the following remark of George Mason as 
recorded by James Madison on July 18, 1787: “The mode of appointing Judges 
may depend in some degree on the mode of trying impeachments, of the 
Executive.”  A citation for this quotation might take the following form: 
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 41-42 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS] (Madison’s 
Notes, Jul. 18, 1787) (statement of George Mason). 
Subsequent citations then would cite the work using the short form of “2 
FARRAND'S RECORDS.” 
III. Theory and Practice of Citing the Records of the Constitutional 
Convention as Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Constitution 
 A.  History of Citing the Records 
                                       
132 See Library of Congress, Farrand’s Records, <http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/
lwfr.html> (visited Feb. 5, 2012). 
133 See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 107-108 (Columbia Law Review 
Ass’n et al. eds., 7th ed. 2000) (Rules 15.1.1 & 15.1.2). 
134 See id. at 43 (Rule 4.2(b)). 
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Judicial opinions did not rely on the records of the Constitutional 
Convention during early years for the simple reason that judges and lawyers did 
not have access to the records.  As noted above, the most significant of these 
records, Madison’s notes, were first published in 1840.  But once the records of 
the Convention became public, judges began to cite them for evidence of the 
meaning of the Constitution.  In 1854, the Supreme Court cited Madison’s notes 
in Pennsylvania v. Howard.135  In that case, the Court rejected a challenge under 
the Ex Post Facto Clause136 to the retroactive application of a state inheritance 
statute.  In its opinion, the Court cited Madison’s notes for evidence that the 
Framers did not intend the clause to apply to civil laws.  The Court said: “The 
debates in the federal convention upon the constitution show that the terms ‘ex 
post facto laws’ were understood in a restricted sense, relating to criminal cases 
only, and that the description of Blackstone of such laws was referred to for their 
meaning.  3 Mad. Pap. 1399, 1450, 1579.”137 
The Supreme Court has continued to cite the records of the Convention in 
the modern era.  In the past four decades, the Supreme Court has referred to 
them in at least 71 cases.138  Many of the Court’s landmark constitutional 
decisions rely heavily on them.  In Buckley v. Valeo,139 for example, the Supreme 
Court held among many other things that only the President may appoint officers 
of the United States.140 In its reasoning, the Court considered but rejected an 
argument that this holding would contradict the intent of the Framers by making 
Congress inferior to the executive and judicial branches.141  The Court said: “[T]he 
debates of the Constitutional Convention . . . are replete with expressions of fear 
that the Legislative Branch of the National Government will aggrandize itself at the 
expense of the other two branches.”142  The Court supported this assertion with 
numerous references to Madison’s notes.143  Similarly, in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton,144 both the majority and dissent relied on the records of the 
                                       
135 58 U.S. (17 How.) 456 (1854). 
136 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. 
137 58 U.S. at 463. 
138 WestLaw’s SCT database was searched for “farrand & date(aft 1/1/1982).”  The results 
were reviewed to confirm that the “Farrand” cited was the editor of the Farrand’s Records. 
139 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
140 Id. at 125-126. 
141 Id. at 128-129. 
142 Id. at 129. 
143 See id. at 129-131 & nn. 168-172. 
144 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
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Constitutional Convention in reviewing a state law that limited the ability of 
Congressional incumbents to have their names appear on ballots.145 
Lower courts also regularly cite the records of the Constitutional 
Convention.  More than 230 cases in the past four decades have relied on them.146 
 As one might expect, jurists generally known for taking an originalist perspective 
on constitutional issues—like Judge Frank Easterbrook and retired Judge Robert 
H. Bork—have cited the records in their opinions.147  Perhaps more interestingly, 
jurists not generally considered originalists—like Judge Stephen Reinhardt or 
retired Judge Patricia Wald—also have relied on the records.148  Academic authors 
also pay a great deal of attention to the records of the Constitutional Convention, 
and have cited them in thousands of law review articles that address nearly every 
constitutional issue imaginable.149 
 B.  How the Records of the Constitutional Convention Have Been Cited as 
Evidence of the Original Intent of the Framers 
As odd as this proposition at first may sound, the Constitution in some 
instances may have had more than one “original meaning.”  Specifically, the 
Framers (i.e., the deputies at the Federal Constitutional Convention in 
Philadelphia) may have intended the Constitution to have one meaning, the 
participants at the state ratifying conventions may have understood it to have a 
slightly different meaning, and the words and phrases in the Constitution may 
have had a still different objective meaning based on the customary usage of 
language at the time.  Other works have identified several specific examples of this 
phenomenon.150  Substantial debates have existed for a long time over whether 
one of these types original meanings or any of them should control interpretation 
of the constitution.151  Some writers have argued that the original intent of the 
                                       
145 See id. at 790 (citing “2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 249-250 (M. 
Farrand ed. 1911”). 
146 Westlaw’s ALLCASES database was searched for “farrand /10 records & date(aft 
1/1/1972).” 
147 See, e.g., Plaquemines Port, Harbor and Terminal Dist. v. Federal Maritime Com’n, 838 
F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Bork, J.); City of Milwaukee v. Yeutter, 877 F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 
1989) (Easterbrook, J.). 
148 See, e.g., Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J.); Sierra Club 
v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Wald, J.). 
149 Westlaw’s JLR database was searched for “farrand w/10 records.” 
150 See Gregory E. Maggs, Which Original Meaning of the Constitution Matters to Justice 
Thomas?, 4 NYU Journal of Law & Liberty 494, 499-500 (2009) 
151 See id. at 500-501. 
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Framers is the most important,152 others believe it is the original understanding of 
the ratifiers,153 still others have said that it is the original objective meaning,154 
and of course some may contend that the original meaning should not control 
modern interpretation of the Constitution.155 
This essay does not seek to enter the controversy over which original 
meaning, if any, is most significant.  Instead, it will suffice to point out that most 
writers who cite the records of the Constitutional Convention claim that the 
records provide evidence of the original intent of the Framers, as opposed to the 
original understanding of the ratifiers or the original objective meaning of the 
Constitution.  Their theory for citing the records to show the Famers’ intent is not 
often articulated, but it presumably rests on the reasoning that the most direct 
way to determine what the Framers intended—given that we cannot ask them 
now—is to look at the comments, suggestions, arguments, and other remarks that 
they made while drafting and approving the Constitution.  (The following section of 
this part considers possible, although limited, ways in which the records 
alternatively might provide evidence of the original understanding of the ratifiers 
or the original objective meaning.) 
Making claims about the original intent of the Framers based on the records 
of the Constitutional Convention unfortunately is usually not a simple exercise.  It 
would be very convenient for us now if at the Convention James Madison, 
                                       
152 See Edwin Meese III, Speech Before the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), in 
ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 47, 53 (Steven Calabresi ed., 2007);  Lino A. 
Graglia, “Interpreting” the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1024 (1991-
1992). 
153 James Madison, for example, wrote: “[W]hatever veneration might be entertained for 
the body of men who formed our Constitution, the sense of that body could never be 
regarded as the oracular guide in expounding the Constitution. As the instrument came 
from them it was nothing more than the draft of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life 
and validity were breathed into it by the voice of the people, speaking through the several 
State Conventions. If we were to look, therefore, for the meaning of the instrument beyond 
the face of the instrument, we must look for it, not in the General Convention, which 
proposed, but in the State Conventions, which accepted and ratified the Constitution.”  5 
Annals of Cong., supra note 17, at 776 (1796) (remarks of James Madison on April 6, 
1796). 
154 Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, IN A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“What I 
look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of 
the text, not what the original draftsmen intended.”). 
155 See supra note 8 (citing classic examples). 
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Gouveneur Morris, James Wilson, or some other deputy had made succinct 
speeches defining each of the terms in the Constitution, giving examples of how 
they should apply in a variety of situations, and then asking for and receiving 
some indication that the majority of the other deputies concurred.  But that did 
not happen often.  The deputies very rarely explicitly defined terms or addressed 
ambiguities.  And they did not take votes about the correctness of everything that 
was said. 
As a result, writers using the records to make claims about what the 
Framers intended usually must rely on indirect clues and logical reasoning for 
support.  It would be impossible to attempt to list and describe all of the different 
kinds of evidence and kinds of reasoning writers have used or could use.  But 
what follows are four of the most common types of reasoning used by judges and 
academics when making assertions about how the records of the Convention show 
the Framers’  Intent: 
 1. Reliance on Arguments Made in Support of Provisions that Ultimately Were 
Included in the Constitution. 
 Sometimes courts and other writers make claims about the Framers’ intent 
with respect to particular constitutional provisions by citing arguments that 
deputies had made in support of those provisions.  For example, in United States 
v. International Business Machines Corp.,156 the Supreme Court had to decide 
whether the Export Clause prohibited imposing a federal tax on insurance policies 
covering exported goods.  The Export Clause says:  “No Tax or Duty shall be laid 
on Articles exported from any State.”157  The government argued for a narrow 
interpretation of the Export Clause that would allow the Court to uphold the 
tax.158  But the Court concluded that the Framers had intended to deny Congress 
the power to tax exports at all, and therefore that Congress could not tax the 
insurance policies.159  In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited statements 
made by deputies who spoke in favor of adopting the clause.  The Court said: 
While the original impetus may have had a narrow focus, the 
remedial provision that ultimately became the Export Clause does 
not, and there is substantial evidence from the Debates that 
proponents of the Clause fully intended the breadth of scope that is 
                                       
156 517 U.S. 843 (1996). 
157 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 5. 
158 517 U.S. at 859. 
159 Id. at 859-860. 
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evident in the language.   See, e. g., 2 Farrand, Records of the Federal 
Convention . . . at 220 (Mr. King: “In two great points the hands of 
the Legislature were absolutely tied. The importation of slaves could 
not be prohibited-exports could not be taxed”); id., at 305 (“Mr. 
Mason urged the necessity of connecting with the power of levying 
taxes . . . that no tax should be laid on exports”); id., at 360 (Mr. 
Elseworth [sic]: “There are solid reasons agst. Congs taxing exports”); 
ibid. (“Mr. Butler was strenuously opposed to a power over exports”); 
id., at 361 (Mr. Sherman: “It is best to prohibit the National 
legislature in all cases”); id., at 362 (“Mr. Gerry was strenuously 
opposed to the power over exports”).160 
 Notice in this passage that none of the speakers quoted directly said 
anything like “the clause we are adopting imposes a complete ban on federal taxes 
on exports.” What each of the quoted speakers said instead indicated that they 
supported a complete ban such taxes.  The Court’s unspoken logical inference is 
that the arguments of these speakers prevailed and, in the Export Clause that was 
ultimately adopted, they achieved what they wanted: a complete ban on taxes on 
exports. 
 The theory for citing arguments made by persons who supported a 
constitutional provision as evidence of the provision’s intended meaning is familiar 
to anyone who studies legislative debates.  When a provision is debated and then 
approved, it is usually the people who supported the provisions whose views 
prevailed and whose views therefore reflect the majority’s sentiments.  This theory 
may not be true in all cases because supporters of a provision may have different 
understandings of the provision or because compromises may have been 
necessary to obtain passage.  But the theory is not an uncommon or baseless 
generalization. 
 2.  Reliance on the Rejection of Arguments Made Against Provisions that were 
Ultimately Included in the Constitution.   
 Sometimes writers rely on the rejection of arguments made by opponents of 
constitutional provisions to determine the meaning of those provisions.  For 
example, when a prohibition on ex post facto laws was proposed, Oliver Ellsworth 
and James Wilson argued against including the prohibition on grounds that the ex 
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post facto law violated principles of natural law and that it was therefore 
unnecessary to include them.161  Madison documented the arguments as follows: 
Mr. ELSEWORTH contended that there was no lawyer, no civilian 
who would not say that ex post facto laws are void of themselves. It 
can not then be necessary to prohibit them. 
Mr. WILSON was against inserting any thing in the Constitution as to 
ex post facto laws. It will bring reflexions on the Constitution—and 
proclaim that we are ignorant of the first principles of Legislation, or 
are constituting a Government which will be so . . . .162 
Dr. William Johnson went further, and argued that including an express 
prohibition on ex post facto laws would be dangerous because it might suggest 
that Congress would pass improper laws if not restrained: 
Doc'r JOHNSON thought the clause unnecessary, and implying an 
improper suspicion of the National Legislature.163 
 The Convention, however, apparently rejected all of these arguments against 
including express prohibitions against ex post facto clauses because the Ex Post 
Facto clauses were included in the Constitution.164  Professor Susannah Sherry 
concludes from the debate:  “This exchange strongly suggests that the deputies, 
who by this time understood that they were enacting fundamental law, did not 
intend to enact positively all existing fundamental law, instead relying on 
unwritten natural rights to supplement the enacted Constitution.”165 In other 
words, the rejection of the arguments of the opponents of the clauses, according to 
Professor Sherry, indicated that the deputies as a whole did not think that by 
expressing some protections in the Constitution, they were necessarily excluding 
unstated protections. 
 Notice here again the evidence for the conclusion about the Framer’s intent 
is indirect.  No one said expressly: “When we include some rights expressly in the 
Constitution, we do not mean to suggest that other rights are not protected.”  But 
Professor Sherry infers this to be the case because the Convention rejected the 
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arguments of those who said that such a suggestion would be implicit.  The theory 
here is that the Framers’ intent differs from the views of those who opposed 
provisions that were adopted.  The theory must rest on the idea that, if the 
opponents’ arguments had been accepted, then the provisions would not be 
adopted.  Again, while this may sometimes be an overgeneralization, it is a 
common type of argument when attempting to discern the intent of a deliberative 
body. 
 3.  Reliance on Negative Inferences Drawn from Proposals that were Rejected 
by the Convention 
 In some instances, writers rely on proposals rejected by the Constitutional 
Convention to show the Framers’ intent.  For example, in Kawakita v. United 
States, a person holding Japanese and American citizenship challenged his 
conviction for treason for actions taken in Japan during World War II.166  He 
argued that treason against the United States cannot be committed abroad by an 
American with a dual nationality.  Relying heavily on the records of the 
Constitutional Convention, the Supreme Court rejected the argument, saying:     
The definition of treason . . . contained in the Constitution contains 
no territorial limitation. “Treason against the United States, shall 
consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their 
Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. * * *’ ” Art. III, § 3.  A 
substitute proposal containing some territorial limitations was 
rejected by the Constitutional Convention. See 2 Farrand, The 
Records of the Federal Convention, pp. 347-348. . . . We must 
therefore reject the suggestion that an American citizen living beyond 
the territorial limits of the United States may not commit treason 
against them. 167 
The cited excerpt from records says the following: 
 Mr. Govr Morris and Mr Randolph wished to substitute the 
words of the British Statute <and moved to postpone Sect. 2. art VII 
in order to consider the following substitute—“Whereas it is essential 
to the preservation of liberty to define precisely and exclusively what 
shall constitute the crime of Treason, it is therefore ordained, 
declared & established, that if a man do levy war agst. the U. S. 
within their territories, or be adherent to the enemies of the U. S. 
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within the said territories, giving them aid and comfort within their 
territories or elsewhere, and thereof be provably attainted of open 
deed by the People of his condition, he shall be adjudged guilty of 
Treason”> 
On this question:  N.H  Mas- no. Ct. no. N. J- ay Pa. no. Del. no. Md. 
no. Va.- ay. N. C. no- S. C. no. Geo- no. [Ayes -- 2; noes -- 8.]168 
 Notice that the deputies did not expressly resolve that treason was a crime 
that might be committed anywhere in the world.  Instead, they rejected a proposal 
that would have expressly established that the crime of treason can be committed 
only within the territory of the United States.  The Court infers from the rejection 
of this proposal that the Convention did not want to impose any territorial 
limitations.  Again, the logic is not iron-tight; it could be that the Convention 
rejected the proposal for reasons other than the proposed territorial limitation.  
Still, the inference drawn by the Supreme Court is one commonly drawn when 
looking at evidence of this type. 
4. Reliance on Comparisons of Different Draft Versions of Provisions 
Ultimately Included in the Constitution. 
 Various parts of the Constitution went through multiple drafts before 
reaching their final forms.  Sometimes judges and other writers draw inferences 
from changes made in these various drafts.  For example, in Utah v. Evans,169 the 
Supreme Court had to determine the meaning of the term “actual enumeration” in 
the Census Clause.170   The State of Utah challenged the method by which the 
Census Bureau was gathering its data.  Utah argued that the words “actual 
Enumeration” required the Census Bureau to seek out each individual that the 
Census Bureau counted and therefore contended that the Census Bureau 
therefore could not rely upon “imputation” or the completion of data by making 
assumptions.171  The Court rejected this view, focusing on how the words “actual 
enumeration” came to appear in the final draft.  The Court said: 
The history of the constitutional phrase supports our understanding 
of the text.  The Convention sent to its Committee of Detail a draft 
stating that Congress was to “regulate the number of representatives 
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(emphasis added and footnote omitted). 
169 536 U.S. 452 (2002). 
170 U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
171 See 536 U.S. at 473-74. 
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by the number of inhabitants, . . . which number shall . . . be taken 
in such manner as . . . [Congress] shall direct.” 2 M. Farrand, 
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 178, 182-183 . . . .  
After making minor, here irrelevant, changes, the Committee of Detail 
sent the draft to the Committee of Style, which, in revising the 
language, added the words “actual Enumeration.” Id., at 590, 591.  
Although not dispositive, this strongly suggests a similar meaning, for 
the Committee of Style “had no authority from the Convention to alter 
the meaning” of the draft Constitution submitted for its review and 
revision. . . . Hence, the Framers would have intended the current 
phrase, “the actual Enumeration shall be made . . . in such Manner 
as [Congress] . . . shall by Law direct,” as the substantive equivalent 
of the draft phrase, “which number [of inhabitants] shall . . . be taken 
in such manner as [Congress] shall direct.”  2 Farrand 183.172 
 In other words, the language initially approved by the Convention did not 
use the words “actual enumeration.”  These words were added by the Committee 
of Style, a committee that was directed not to change any meanings.  The 
inference therefore is that even though the clause uses the words “actual 
enumeration,” the Framers intended the clause to mean the same thing that it 
would have meant if it did not contain these specific words.  While that was the 
conclusion of the Supreme Court in this case, other changes in the language of 
drafts, however, might indicate that the framers intended to change the meaning 
of other provisions of the Constitution. 
 The foregoing examples show just four ways that courts and scholars have 
relied on the records of the Constitutional Convention in making claims about the 
Framers’ intent.  These four ways are not the only ways that the records may be 
used, but they are among the most common.  Certainly other writers, using logic 
and ingenuity, may find additional ways to make inferences about what the 
Framers intended based on the Records. 
 C.   How the Records of the Constitutional Convention have been used as 
Evidence of the Original Understanding of the Ratifiers or as Evidence of 
the Original Objective Meaning of the Constitution 
 Although the records of the Constitutional Convention are mostly relied on 
to support claims about the original intent of the Framers, the records also might 
provide limited evidence of the original understanding of the ratifiers and of the 
original objective meaning of the Constitution. 
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 The best evidence of the original understanding of the ratifiers comes from 
the records of the state ratifying conventions.173  But those records are not the 
only evidence.  An argument that the records of the Convention might be relevant 
is the following: Deputies to the federal Convention also served as delegates to the 
state ratifying conventions in every state except Rhode Island.174  Their views, 
accordingly, represent not only the views of the Framers, but also the views of at 
least some of the ratifiers.175  Indeed, they may reflect the ideas of some of the 
most important ratifiers because many of these deputies played very important 
roles at the state conventions.  It is thus probably not a stretch to imagine that 
their understanding of the Constitution helped to shape the understanding of 
others at the ratifying conventions.  Thus, even though the Records of the 
Constitutional Convention were not published until later, they may provide some 
indirect evidence about what the ratifiers were thinking. 
 One example comes from U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.176  In that case, 
the Court discussed at considerable length what the ratifiers of the Constitution 
thought about the need for “rotation” of public officials by limiting the maximum 
years or terms that they could remain in office.  The Court said: 
The draft of the Constitution that was submitted for ratification 
contained no provision for rotation.  In arguments . . . opponents of 
ratification condemned the absence of a rotation requirement, noting 
that “there is no doubt that senators will hold their office perpetually; 
and in this situation, they must of necessity lose their dependence, 
and their attachments to the people.”  Even proponents of ratification 
expressed concern about the “abandonment in every instance of the 
necessity of rotation in office.”  At several ratification conventions, 
participants proposed amendments that would have required 
rotation.177 
While this passage was addressing the understanding of the ratifiers, the Court 
bolstered its assertions with a footnote citing the records of the Constitutional 
Convention.  The footnote said in part: “A proposal requiring rotation for Members 
of the House was proposed at the Convention, see 1 Farrand 20, but was defeated 
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174 See infra appendix B. 
175 See id. 
176 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
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unanimously, see id., at 217.”178  The thought in including this footnote appears to 
have been that it lends credibility to claims about the original understanding of 
the ratifiers to point out that their asserted understanding matches the intent of 
the Framers, especially when so many of the Framers participated in ratification 
debates. 
 The records of the Constitutional Convention also may provide some 
evidence of the original objective meaning of the Constitution.  This meaning, as 
discussed above, is the meaning that the public would have attached to the words 
and phrases in the Constitution based on their ordinary meanings and context.  
Courts often rely on period dictionaries to determine the objective meaning of 
words.  But they can also make inferences about the meaning by examining texts 
of all sorts from the period.  Because the Records of the Constitutional Convention 
are from the relevant era, they thus can provide some evidence of the original 
objective meaning. 
 For example, in seeking to determine the original objective meaning of the 
term “commerce” in the Commerce Clause,179 Professor Randy Barnett looked at a 
wide variety of period sources to see how the word was used.180  These sources 
included the other text in the Constitution, contemporary dictionaries, the 
Federalist Papers, notes from the state ratification debates, early judicial 
interpretations, and in addition all of these, record of the constitutional 
convention.  Professor Barnett says in part: 
In Madison's notes for the Constitutional Convention, the term 
“commerce” appears thirty-four times in the speeches of the 
delegates. Eight of these are unambiguous references to commerce 
with foreign nations which can only consist of trade. In every other 
instance, the terms “trade” or “exchange” could be substituted for the 
term “commerce” with the apparent meaning of the statement 
preserved.  In no instance is the term “commerce” clearly used to 
refer to “any gainful activity” or anything broader than trade.  
Professor Barnett is not making any claims about what the Framers subjectively 
intended the Commerce Clause to mean.  Instead, he is just looking at how the 
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people of the period, including the Framers, used the word “commerce” in order to 
determine its objective meaning.  The theory is apparently that the records of the 
constitutional convention provide a substantial body of linguistic evidence of how 
words and phrases—especially the words in phrases in the Constitution—were 
used.  This body of linguistic evidence may be considered along with other 
evidence to determine the objective meaning of the words in the Constitution at 
the time of its adoption. 
IV. Potential Grounds for Impeaching Claims about the Original Meaning of 
the Constitution that Rely on the Records of the Constitutional Convention 
Many lawyers, judges, and scholars correctly approach the records of the 
Constitutional Convention with a degree of awe.  The records preserve the 
thoughts of the great figures of the founding era as they were drafting and 
debating the nation’s most fundamental legal document.  Perusing the records, 
accordingly, is almost like joining the framers at the Constitutional Convention, 
facing with them the great issues, and watching as the framers work through 
them. 
The august provenance of the records, however, should not blur careful 
thought about their use as evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution.  
Some writers fall into the mistake of thinking that, because a particular passage 
appears in the notes and records of the Convention, the passage offers definitive 
proof about what the Constitution means.  In reality, statements taken from the 
notes and records of the Constitutional Convention do not always provide 
unassailable evidence of the original meaning.  In fact, when someone makes an 
argument about the original intent of the Framers that relies on the records of the 
convention to support a controversial claim, it is not uncommon for someone else 
to disagree about whether the evidence supports the claim. 
The following paragraphs identify six important potential grounds for 
impeaching claims made about the original meaning of the Constitution based on 
passages taken from the records of the Constitutional Convention.  Not all claims 
about the original meaning suffer from the weaknesses identified by this list of 
grounds for impeachment.  In addition, each of the identified grounds is also 
subject to significant limitations or counter arguments.  Yet, a good practice would 
be for any writers making assertions based on the records, or any readers 
assessing the assertions of others, to consider in each case whether any of these 
potential criticisms is applicable. 
1. The claim relies on specific words included in the records without 




Writers sometimes rely on the specific words used in the records of the 
Constitutional Convention when making claims about the original meaning of the 
Constitution.  For example, in Nixon v. Sirica, a case involving President Richard 
Nixon, Judge MacKinnon placed special emphasis on Gouverneur Morris’s use of 
the word “after” in a statement about the relationship between a criminal trial and 
an impeachment.181  Judge MacKinnon wrote: 
The contemporaneous view of the Framers clearly supports the view 
that all aspects of criminal prosecution of a President must follow 
impeachment. For example, Gouverneur Morris stated during the 
debates on impeachment that: 
A conclusive reason for making the Senate instead of the 
Supreme Court the Judge of impeachments, was that 
the latter was to try the President after the trial of the 
impeachment. 
2 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention 500 (rev. ed. 1966) 
(emphasis added).182 
A potential ground for questioning claims of this sort is that the deputies 
who took notes at the Convention could not and did not make verbatim 
transcripts of what was said at the Convention.  In most instances, for this 
reason, no one can know for certain whether the notes record the specific words 
that the deputies used when debating the Constitution.  James Madison, who kept 
the most thorough records, prefaces his account with this important warning: 
It may be proper to remark, that, with a very few exceptions, the 
speeches were neither furnished, nor revised, nor sanctioned, by the 
speakers, but written out from my notes, aided by the freshness of 
my recollections.183 
For this reason, Madison’s notes seldom provide an exact account of the various 
deputies’ views on particular issues. 
In the quotation of Gouverneur Morris above, Madison may not have 
captured Morris’s exact words.  For example, Morris might have said something 
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lengthy like:  “A conclusive reason for making the Senate instead of the Supreme 
Court the Judge of impeachments is that two separate trials are possible.  The 
Senate can try the impeachment and remove the President from office, and the 
courts can try the President separately on any criminal charges and put him in 
prison.”  Madison may have abbreviated this longer statement by simply saying 
the courts would try the President “after” the trial of impeachment.  The 
abbreviation would not be wholly accurate, but abbreviations by definition are not 
never a complete account of something. 
We know that Madison’s notes plainly omit much of what the Deputies said 
during debates.  James H. Hutson has calculated that in the month of June, when 
Madison took the greatest volume of his notes, he wrote down on average only 
2,740 words per session.184  A person speaking at the normal speaking rate of 180 
words per minute could say all of these words in about 15 minutes.185  The 
deputies surely must have said much more during their day long meetings, but we 
will never know exactly what they said. 
Even when the various note takers sought to memorialize what their fellow 
deputies were saying, they clearly did not copy every word verbatim.  We know 
this because the notes often disagree about what exactly was said.  A good 
example concerns the Constitution’s provision saying that “Congress shall have 
Power . . . To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.”186  In attempting 
to discern the original intention of the Framers, Professor David Engdahl has 
observed that the Convention records offer conflicting accounts of its drafting.  He 
explains: 
Madison . . . reports that the motion used the word “institute,” not 
“constitute.”  “Institute” also was the word  Dickinson used in the 
earlier comment that prompted the Wilson-Madison motion.  
Accounts of the same motion in the Journal and in Yates’s notes use 
the word “appoint” instead. Moreover, Madison reports that 
discussion of the motion took place in terms of “establishing” such 
courts.  Both the Journal and Madison show the word “appoint” 
being used when the proposition was reaffirmed on July 18th; and 
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“appoint” was the word employed in the resolution as referred to the 
Committee of Detail.187 
This kind of disagreement, needless to say, makes it difficult to rely on any of the 
words quoted on the subject. 
Another factor may contribute to a discrepancy between what was actually 
said and what Madison’s notes record:  Madison appears to have expanded many 
of his own remarks at the Convention.  In several instances, Madison’s accounts 
of his speeches may take multiple pages, while other note takers may summarize 
them in just a few lines.  James H. Hutson hypothesizes that Madison spoke 
extemporaneously, and then wrote down and augmented his remarks after each 
session was completed.188  Given that Madison took the most notes and did the 
second most talking, this shortcoming of the notes has substantial significance.  
For these reasons, anyone reading the notes should avoid placing excessive 
weight on any particular choice of words.  The quotations may not be entirely 
accurate.  This caveat, however, does not mean that the notes are completely 
unreliable.  Scholars and judges stand on firmer ground when they cite the notes 
as evidence of what the deputies were generally thinking.  They are on weakest 
ground when they assume that direct quotation of the words used in the notes 
proves exactly what the deputies said. 
To return to the example above, given the general nature of his remarks, it 
appears that Gouverneur Morris was arguing that both the Senate and the courts 
should be involved when the President is accused of committing a crime because 
two separate trials are necessary.  The issue of whether the criminal trial should 
come before or after the Senate’s trial of the impeachment is not central to his 
argument.  (It is certainly possible for a criminal trial to occur before an 
impeachment; although a President has not faced criminal charges, federal judges 
have been tried and convicted of criminal offenses in court before ever being tried 
by the Senate and removed from office.189)  For this reason, although excessive 
reliance on the word “after” in Morris’s quotation may be questionable, reliance on 
the general idea that there should be two trials, one in the Senate and one in the 
courts, is much less so. 
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2. The claim relies on particular statements in the records of the Convention 
without recognizing that the records also contain contradictory statements.  
The Convention records are numerous, they are not verbatim, and they 
include the works of several different participants.  For these reasons, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the records contain numerous contradictory statements.  For 
example, consider the provision in Article III giving federal courts jurisdiction over 
cases “arising under laws of the United States.”190  One question, discussed by 
Steward Jay, is whether the Framers intended the term “laws of the United States” 
to include only federal legislation or whether the term includes both federal 
legislation and federal common law.191  A proponent of the idea that the Framers 
were thinking only about statutes might cite the Journal for evidence of the 
original intent.  The Journal records that, on July 18, 1787, the Convention 
resolved that “the jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall extend to cases 
arising under laws passed by the general Legislature . . . .”192  Although the 
Committee on Detail later made stylistic changes, the July 18 resolution certainly 
suggests that the deputies were thinking only of legislation and not of common 
law.  Madison’s notes, however, provide a different account of the Convention’s 
resolution.  According to Madison, the Convention resolved that federal courts 
would have jurisdiction in cases arising “under the Natl. laws.”193  Under this 
resolution, the term “National laws” might include both federal common law and 
legislation.194 
This example does not prove that every statement in the records is 
unreliable because it is contradicted by some other statement.  Nor does it show 
that writers can place no reliance on contradicted statements. But the example 
does show that anyone who cites statements taken from notes of the 
Constitutional Convention needs to look carefully for contradictory evidence.  
Farrand’s Records includes both a general index,195 and an index by clauses of the 
Constitution.196  These superb indices can be extremely helpful in finding 
everything said about a particular topic and thus help to locate potential conflicts. 
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If conflicts are found, then writers must find reasons for choosing one view over 
the other.  A statement in a resolution adopted by the Convention, for example, 
may carry more weight than an oral aside made by one of the parties when 
debating an unrelated issue. 
3. The claim relies on particular statements in the records of the convention 
without recognizing that evidence from other sources contradicts the 
statements. 
Sometimes statements in the records of the federal Convention contradict 
evidence from other sources.  For example, they may conflict with arguments 
made at the state ratifying conventions, remarks in the Federalist Papers, and 
debates about early federal legislation.  These contradictions weaken the authority 
of all of the sources. 
Professor Jonathan Turley has identified one example.197  At the Convention, 
Madison argued that “mal-administration” was not an appropriate ground for the 
impeachment of the President because it was too ambiguous.198  Yet, several years 
later while serving as a member of Congress, Madison said that mal-
administration would be a basis for impeachment.199  Madison either changed his 
mind, or the records contain an error; either way, historians have difficulty using 
these sources to determine the original meaning of the Constitution.   
The existence of contrary statements should come as little surprise.  The 
confidentiality of the Convention proceedings may have freed the deputies from 
the burden of adhering to their views; they could change their minds without 
others knowing about it.  Accordingly, looking at the notes alone seldom produces 
a complete account of what the deputies at the Federal Convention were thinking. 
An extremely useful source for identifying potential conflict among sources is The 
Founders' Constitution, a 5-volume work edited by Philip B. Kurland and Ralph 
Lerner, which is available both in print and online.200  The editors of this work 
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have located, collected, and reprinted historical sources—including records of the 
Constitutional Convention—that address nearly every clause in the Constitution. 
4. The claim relies on particular statements in the records of the convention 
but it is unclear that the majority of the deputies agreed with the position 
stated. 
  Many authors cite statements in the records without indicating who made 
the statements or whether the Convention agreed with them.  For example, in 
Saenz v. Roe, the Supreme Court cited a single sentence from the Records as 
evidence that the Framers based Article IV of the Constitution on Article IV of the 
Articles of Confederation.201  The Court, however, did not indicate who uttered the 
sentence or whether anyone agreed with it.  
This practice is generally unpersuasive because some excerpts from the 
Record do not reflect the intent of the Framers.  A total of fifty-five deputies 
attended the Convention.  They expressed a wide variety of different ideas during 
their debates.  Sometimes the majority of deputies (or at least a majority of the 
state delegations) agreed with the arguments, and sometimes they did not.  In 
some instances, speakers addressed topics that the Convention never thought 
necessary to decide by vote.  For this reason, even if a passage presents evidence 
of what one of the deputies believed, it does not necessarily prove that all of the 
deputies shared that belief.  Before citing passages from the records, authors 
should consider their content and context.202  They stand on firmest ground when 
they can point to the kinds of reasoning described in part III.B. for inferring that 
statements or action reveal the Framers’ intent with respect to particular matter. 
5. The claim relies on excerpts from the records of the Constitutional 
Convention that lack sufficient detail to support the proposition for which 
they are cited. 
  Anyone reading the notes and records of the Constitutional Convention for 
evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution soon discovers the deputies 
often are not recorded as having said much about the issues they confronted.  The 
notes cover many topics with just a phrase, a sentence, or possibly a paragraph, 
and on some issues there is almost no explication.  For example, the Supreme 
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112 (M. Farrand ed. 1966)”).  The statement was by Charles Pinckney. 
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Court has observed that the clause providing for the appointment of inferior 
officers203 “was added to the proposed Constitution on the last day of the Grand 
Convention, with little discussion.”204  In such cases, statements taken from the 
notes and records often lack sufficient detail to provide persuasive evidence of the 
original meaning on particular questions. 
For this reason, critics sometimes dismiss claims about the original 
meaning if they are based on what they consider ambiguous snippets taken from 
the records.  For instance, in reviewing Raoul Berger’s book, Federalism: The 
Founders’ Design, Professor Mark V. Tushnet wrote that he found the account of 
the original intent regarding federalism “massively unconvincing,” asserting that 
Berger had justified his claims by taking “snippets of statements about federalism 
from the debates on the Constitution, as if a compilation of snippets amounted to 
an interpretation of intent.”205  Similarly, Professor Calvin R. Massey, questioned 
whether the Supreme Court by “[s]titching together snippets of . . . expressions of 
concern in the 1787 Convention”206 had properly discerned the original intent of 
the Framers on the subject of state imposed term limits on members of Congress 
in U.S. Term Limits v. Thorton.207  
Although this potential ground for impeachment may have merit in some 
instances, it is not universally true that the records are too ambiguous to provide 
any guidance on the original meaning of the Constitution with respect to all 
issues.  For example, the Records make abundantly clear that, when the 
Constitution uses the phrase “three fifths of all other Persons” in explaining the 
apportionment of representatives and direct taxes,208 the term “other Persons” is a 
euphemism for slaves.209 
Writers can best avoid the potential criticism simply by not exaggerating 
what the records show.  If the records do not provide clear answers, they should 
acknowledge this limitation.  For example, in Powell v. McCormack, the Supreme 
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Court confronted the question of whether the House of Representatives could 
exclude Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. from its membership based on his prior 
misconduct.210  An important issue in the case was whether the age, citizenship, 
and residency requirements set forth in Article I are the exclusive qualifications for 
representatives.211  The Supreme Court considered numerous passages from the 
records of the Constitutional Convention.  Although these records contained some 
relevant statements, the Court ultimately announced that the debates themselves 
simply were inconclusive on the specific issue before it.212   
6. The claim relies on statements taken from the records without recognizing 
the potential personal biases of the individuals who created the records.  
The seven deputies who took notes did not attend the Convention as 
disinterested observers.  On the contrary, they actively participated in the debates. 
Each of them had their own views of the issues.  The two deputies who took the 
most copious notes, Madison and Yates, fundamentally disagreed about the 
project of the Convention.  The personal views of the deputies may have colored 
their notes or even led them to misreport the views of the other deputies.   
Professor William W. Crosskey famously accused Madison of this type of bias.  
Crosskey asserted that, for political reasons, Madison “presented falsely the 
sentiments of other men” and invented statements that he put in his notes.213  
Professor Richard B. Bernstein and Kym S. Rice similarly have speculated that 
Robert Yates may have been taking notes to provide “ammunition to justify his 
and Lansing’s opposition to the Convention.”214 
No surefire method exists for assessing the degree of intentional or 
unintentional bias in the notes taken by deputies.  Indeed, even if Madison or the 
other note takers accurately recorded some of the debates, they could have 
distorted other parts.  For this reason, claims about the original intent of the 
Framers ideally should rest on notes taken by more than one person.  If the notes 
of several deputies express similar sentiments, the likelihood that any one them 
misrepresented the proceedings diminishes. 
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This essay has attempted to provide guidance to judge, lawyers, law 
students, and others who are seeking to make or evaluate arguments about the 
original meaning of the Constitution based on the records of the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787.  Beyond describing the Convention, its records, and how 
writers cite the records, its most important message is that task of using the 
records to show the original meaning of the Constitution is difficult.  The records 
unfortunately do not provide direct answers to most questions.  Instead, it is 
necessary in most cases to draw inferences from arguments made by supporters 
or opponents of particular provisions or from variations in drafts. Even then, there 
are important pitfalls to avoid in making claims about the original meaning. 
Appendix A.  Annotated Bibliography 
1. Max Farrand’s classic Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (rev. ed. 
1937) (4 volumes) contains all the notes and records of the Constitutional 
Convention known until 1937.  The introduction contains an extremely detailed 
account of who took notes, when they were published, and why they may have 
inaccuracies.  The indices are invaluable as finding aids.  The first three volumes 
are available on line at the Library of Congress’s website: http://memory.
loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwfr.html 
2.  James Hutson’s Supplement to Max Farrand’s The Records of the Federal 
Convention of 1787 (1987), updates the earlier four volumes by including sources 
discovered between 1937 and 1987. 
3.  John R. Vile’s The Constitutional Convention of 1787: A Comprehensive 
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clauses, and contains then contains historical sources from the founding period—
including records from the Constitutional Convention—that address those 
sources.  The works is available at the University of Chicago Press’s website: 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders. 
5.  The Framing of the Federal Constitution (1979) by Robert Morris provides 
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6.  Are We to be a Nation (1987), by Richard B. Bernstein and with Kym S. 
Rice, contains an informative account not only of what the Framers did at 
Philadelphia but also the context in which they acted. 
7.  James H. Hutson’s article, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity 
of the Documentary Record, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1986), presents highly interesting 
information about the notes and records of the Constitutional Convention, 
including many potential problems in relying on them for evidence of the original 
meaning of the Constitution. 
8.  Robert N. Clinton provides an introductory description, designed for law 
students, in A Brief History of the Adoption of the United States Constitution, 75 
IOWA L. REV. 891 (1990). 
Appendix B.  Table of Deputies at the Constitutional Convention 
* = did not sign the Constitution 
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